Fungi and fungal toxins as weapons by Paterson, R. R. M.
ava i lab le at www.sc iencedi rec t . com
journa l homepage : www.e lsev ier . com/ loca te /mycres
my c o l o g i c a l r e s e a r c h 1 1 0 ( 2 0 0 6 ) 1 0 0 3 – 1 0 1 0Review
Fungi and fungal toxins as weapons
R. Russell M. PATERSON*
Micoteca da Universidade do Minho, Centro de Engenharia Biolo´gica, Campus de Gualtar, 4710-057 Braga, Portugal
a r t i c l e i n f o
Article history:
Received 19 December 2005
Received in revised form
27 February 2006
Accepted 1 March 2006
Corresponding Editor:
Nicholas P. Money
Keywords:
Biocontrol agents
Bioweapons
Mycotoxin decontamination
Mycotoxins
Mycotoxicosis treatments
Pharmaceuticals
Toxins
a b s t r a c t
Recent aggressive attacks on innocent citizens have resulted in governments increasing
security. However, there is a good case for prevention rather than reaction. Bioweapons,
mycotoxins, fungal biocontrol agents (FBCA), and even pharmaceuticals contain, or are,
toxins and need to be considered in the context of the new paradigm. Is it desirable to dis-
cuss such issues? None of the fungi are (a) as toxic as botulinum toxin from Clostridium
botulinum, and (b) as dangerous as nuclear weapons. One toxin may be defined as a
pharmaceutical and vice versa simply by a small change in concentration or a moiety. My-
cotoxins are defined as naturally occurring toxic compounds obtained from fungi. They are
the biggest chronic health risk when incorporated into the diet. The current list of fungal
toxins as biochemical weapons is small, although awareness is growing of the threats
they may pose. T-2 toxin is perhaps the biggest concern. A clear distinction is required be-
tween the biological (fungus) and chemical (toxin) aspects of the issue. There is an obvious
requirement to be able to trace these fungi and compounds in the environment and to
knowwhen concentrations are abnormal. Many FBCA, produce toxins. This paper indicates
how to treat mycotoxicosis and decontaminate mycotoxins. There is considerable confu-
sion and inconsistency surrounding this topic which requires assessment in an impartial
and scientific manner.
ª 2006 The British Mycological Society. Published by Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.Introduction
Recent mass attacks on citizens make it necessary to
consider the implications of fungi as weapons. Because of
the increased public interest and media attention regarding
bioweapons, there is increased public pressure on relevant
authorities to assess whether occurrences of food contami-
nation are malicious acts (Elad 2005). The economic conse-
quences of a potential attack can be huge, as evidenced
after the recent attacks in the US (Lenain et al. 2002). It is
more provident to prevent a bioweapon attack from happen-
ing in the first place, than to prepare a response. There is the
dilemma of whether to declassify essential information witha view to preventing aggressive acts, or to disclose essential
data to increase public awareness but inadvertently make it
available to the aggressor. A compromise has to be drawn.
However, considering the amount of public information al-
ready available, the rubicon may have been crossed. Some-
what subjectively drawn biosecurity guidelines have been
prepared, which are essential reading to anyone working
with fungi that could be considered as possible threats
(Tucker 2003). They have highly significant implications
that could severely limit research in the field, including
determining which individuals do the work, irrespective of
ability or qualifications. One wonders how representative
the views of a publication are when the disclaimer states,* Corresponding author.
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alone. They do not necessarily reflect views of the United
States Institute of Peace’’. A public debate is required on
this area. Some well-known reports have claimed recently
that aflatoxins were placed in warheads for use by Iraqis, al-
though the effect of such a limited amount of aflatoxins dis-
persed in this manner would be minimal.
Furthermore, the use of fungi in technologies (e.g. biocon-
trol) requires revision because of the heightened security
awareness. This also has ramifications for the health and
safety of those who use these organisms for mass production
or in non-sterile conditions. There is a temptation to ignore
the issue, but this is inappropriate when information is be-
coming increasingly available (Bennet & Klich 2003; Miller
et al. 2005; Paterson & Lima 2005; Stark 2005), in addition to
the dubious mixture of the informative (Locasto et al. 2004)
and illegitimate material on the World Wide Web. A great
deal is know about botulinum from Clostridium botulinum,
which is themost toxic compound in the world (human lethal
dose 0.2–2.0 mg kg1). Fungal toxins although less toxic can be
used as weapons. Some other potential bioweapons are the
smallpox virus, Variola major (Shannon 2004), which resulted
in a 30 % fatality rate in previous epidemics, but can be higher
in vulnerable groups; and Mycobacterium leprae which causes
leprosy and is rarely lethal.
How do fungi compare? Simply to obtain some level of cal-
ibration at the extremes, they are not as dangerous as nu-
clear weapons. Ease of conversion to a weapon is a crucial
factor (i.e. ‘‘weaponization’’). The number of medically im-
portant fungi is lower than, for example, bacteria. Obvious
growth of fungi on animals is called mycosis and they are pri-
mary pathogens (e.g. Histoplasma capsulatum) (Bennet & Klich
2003). Opportunistic pathogenicity is associated with immu-
nocompromised people. Interestingly, Aspergillus fumigatus
is both: causing Farmers’ lung disease, where one assumesthe ‘‘farmers’’ were otherwise healthy (presumably the fun-
gal loads in these cases were enormous), and causing 90 %
of fungal infections in immunocompromised patients (Shep-
pard et al. 2004). Mycosis can range in severity from athlete’s
foot to aspergillosis. Finally, dietary, respiratory, dermal and
other exposure to mycotoxins is called mycotoxicosis.
There is an apparent similarity between fungal biocontrol
agents (FBCA) and weapons, in that toxin-producing fungi
are mass-produced and, for example, sprayed onto crops.
Which raises the question, what are the natural levels of fungi
and toxins in the environment (Gonc¸alves et al. 2006)? Inter-
estingly, pharmaceuticals from fungi are also relevant to the
discussion. The difference between a compound being a toxin
or a drug may be a shift in a decimal point of concentration or
a change in a simple moiety. How these compounds are clas-
sified depends to some extent on the prevailing ‘‘climate’’. For
example, mycophenolic acid, ergot alkaloids, penicillin, and
perhaps patulin, can be either toxins or drugs.
There has always been great interest in toxins from the
macrofungi (e.g. mushrooms): Scientific endeavour started
in mycotoxins with the discovery of aflatoxins in the 1960s.
However, it is an extremely complex field largely due to its
multidisciplinary nature. ‘‘Experts’’ commonly pontificate on
areas in which they are not particularly qualified.
Mycotoxins (Fig 1)
There is little to better the US Council for Agriculture Science &
Technology (CAST) (2003) report on this topic and it is essential
reading. However, Bennet and Klich (2003) are adroit. Paterson
et al. (2004) may be worth consulting for some additional
insights (e.g. the taxonomy of the fungi). An awareness of
Hazard Analysis and Critical Control Point (HACCP)
approaches for control is important (Aldred & Magan 2004;
Paterson 2006a). However, HACCP protocols were developedN
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Fig 1 – Chemical structure of some myocotoxins.
Fungi and fungal toxins as weapons 1005to prevent unintentional contamination; further control and
analytical steps may be required for intentional contamina-
tion. The universality of applying HACCP has been questioned
(Sperber 2005).
Mycotoxins are (a) below microbiological, some phytotox-
ins and phycotoxins, and (b) above anthropogenic contami-
nants, pesticide residues, and food additives in terms of
acute health risks. Significantly, they are the highest chronic
risk factor in the diet (Kuiper-Goodman 2004). However,
chronic effects are of little interest to weapon manufac-
turers, although they are of course relevant in cases of lon-
ger-term exposure. Presumably, the phytotoxins referred to
are toxins from plants and not toxins from microbes that af-
fect plants. It is not totally clear whether toxins (e.g. amani-
tin) from macroscopic fungi would be considered as
mycotoxins or something else (e.g. erroneously as phytotox-
ins). Furthermore, some fungal metabolites are probably
more toxic than mycotoxins (e.g. aflatoxins), which are sim-
ply not detected in the environment (see Cole & Schweikert
2003a,b; Cole et al. 2003). These may be revealed through
natural product screenings for drugs where toxic com-
pounds are removed from further screens at early stages
in the process.
Fig 2 presents a Venn diagram of the overlapping relation-
ship betweenmycotoxins, pharmaceuticals, FBCA toxins, and
fungal biochemical weapons, which illustrates clearly that the
same compound can be represented in different fields. Pres-
ently, there are few metabolites considered to be mycotoxins
out of potentially thousands. There are probably more toxic
metabolites from FBCA than there are mycotoxins in this nar-
row definition but only a few (i.e. three) of them (Table 1) can
be considered as mycotoxins. A minute percentage of toxic
fungal metabolites have been considered seriously as
weapons: two (aflatoxins and T-2 toxin; Fig 3) are obviously
mycotoxins, whereas one is a toxin from a macroscopicfungus, i.e. amanitin, as mentioned previously. This differs
from mycotoxins as the fungus is intentionally eaten, al-
though it has been used to poison food and again the distinc-
tions become blurred. Paterson & Lima (2005) list the ergot
alkaloids (CAST 2003) as other possibilities.
Mycotoxins are a somewhat exclusive group of low molec-
ular weight compounds that are present in foods, and affect
animals (e.g. humans). They are produced by filamentous
fungi, but the fungi may no longer be present in the food. It
is important to realise that mycotoxins are not themost effec-
tive weapons. For example, other toxins from fungi, which are
not found in food, may be more toxic. For this reason a sound
knowledge of which fungi produce which toxins (i.e. fungal
chemotaxonomy) is crucial.
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Fig 2 – Venn diagram of the relationship between fungal
metabolites in terms of toxicity. The sizes of the circles
are in proportion to the actual number of compounds only
in a general manner.Table 1 – Approximate classification of some toxins of fungi
Toxin Grouping
Mycotoxin Pharmaceutical Weapon Fungal biocontrol
agent toxin
Other
entomopathogen toxin
Aflatoxins þa þ þ
Ochratoxin A þa þ
Cytochalasins þ þ
Beauvericin þ þ
Eniantins þ þ
Destruxins þ
Oosporein þ
Moniliformin þ þ
Efrapeptins þ
Beauveriolides þ
Amminita toxins þb þ
Patulin þa þ?c
Mycophenolic acid þ þ
Penicillin þ þ
T-2 toxin þa þ
Ergot alkaloids þa þ
a Regulated in food.
b Arguably mycotoxins as the whole fungus in ingested.
c When originally investigated.
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Some 300–400 are now recognised, although only about
a dozen groups receive regular attention as threats to human
and animal health. The incidence of mycotoxicosis may be
more common than suspected. It is ‘‘easy’’ to attribute the
symptoms of acute mycotoxin poisoning to other causes,
but it is difficult to prove that cancer and other chronic condi-
tions are caused bymycotoxin exposure. The scientific quality
of the mycotoxin literature is variable. There has been much
repetition and an imprecise use of jargon, especially in
toxicology (Bennet &Klich 2003). This is in part due to themul-
tidisciplinary nature of mycotoxin research, which involves
analytical chemistry, toxicology, taxonomic mycology, hy-
gienic measures, microbial physiology, epidemiology, and in-
creasingly weaponry. Too often experts in one field have felt
the need to improvise in another.
Bio/chemical weapons
Fungal toxins as weapons or ‘‘expressions of discontent’’ are
taken seriously. They can be used intrinsically as weapons,
which could be employed by governments and/or small
groupings of individuals. However, an individual could use
them in a revenge attack on an employer for example. The
supposed governmental deployments have ranged from the
suspected use of T-2 toxin by the former Soviet Union (the ev-
idence for this is very thin) to the development of aflatoxins by
Iraq (the efficacy of which is minimal) (Bennet & Klich 2003).
(N.B. T-2 toxin appears to be a valid weapon.) It is axiomatic
to state that any government would be interested in develop-
ing such weapons if they had the desired characteristics.
The factors that are fundamental to produce a serviceable
chemical or biological weapon are: (1) efficient manufacture;
(2) ease of conversion to a weapon (‘‘weaponization’’); (3)
longevity of the organism or toxin in storage; (4) efficient
dispersal; and (5) stability when exposed to the environment.
Other factors are concealment and ability to obtain the toxin
or organism.
In the early twentieth century, biotoxins were investigated
militarily, and were rejected because of the difficulty in con-
version to weapons. However, there has been renewed inter-
est with developments in biotechnology. It has been stated
that the US has no current offensive biological weapons capa-
bility. They are less expensive than nuclear and conventional
chemical weapons andmay appeal to countries or terrorist or-
ganisations where cost is an important issue (Locasto et al.
2004).
Fig 3 – Chemical structure of T-2 toxin.Of course, there is a dilemma surrounding a discussion of
fungal toxins in relation to weapons. Will the information
encourage their use and development, or do the reverse and
provide appropriate information on how to deal with the
potential threat? In any case, there are many reports in the
public arena, including those of a dubious nature on theWorld
Wide Web. Effectively the line has been crossed and a large
amount of literature is available.
Biological per se
Fungi as biological agents of war are not tenable currently
except perhaps for Coccioides immitis (Shannon 2004). Those
that cause human disease are too slow-acting and would
only affect selected members of the population or have to be
applied in vast numbers if they were to be effective at all. An
allergic response is hardly the stuff of weapons. Many fungi
are not pathogens, but produce toxins (Cole & Schweikert
2003a,b; Cole et al. 2003). Conceivably, Aspergillus flavus could
be sprayed onto crops, but this is a ridiculous concept, as
what would be the results? A single destroyed crop at most
(however, see genetically engineered fungi section). To have
a widespread effect the resources required would have to be
enormous, even at the level of supplying enough growth me-
dium for the fungus (Stark 2005). However, the use of Fusarium
oxysporum to kill coca plants and hence cocaine manufactur-
ing, is an interesting comparison (Connick et al. 1998; de Vries
2000). A list of the toxins reported from this species is provided
in Table 2.
Biochemical per se (toxins)
Biotoxins, like chemical weapons such as mustard gas, need
to be made from precursors (ethylene and Cl2 in the case of
mustard gas) under the appropriate conditions. For example,
a growth medium containing carbon and nitrogen as the pre-
dominant precursors must be inoculated with a live fungus in
a suitable vessel (e.g. a bioreactor). The toxin is produced as
a consequence of the metabolism of the fungus and is then
purified. This can be undertaken in large bioreactors thus pro-
ducing a large amount of toxin. So the toxin is a chemical and
has no living component.
Biotoxins have inherent limitations to their manufacture
in sufficient quantities as weapons. It is a small-group assas-
sination tool as only a little can be dispersed effectively in
enclosed areas. Equally, a revenge attack by a disgruntled em-
ployee is a possibility such as on a water distribution system
(Mays 2004). It may be worthwhile illustrating the problem
with an example.
The first report of the (presumably) natural-occurrence of
a mycotoxin, or indeed any fungal secondary metabolite, in
water was by Paterson et al. (1997), which was written after
attempting to produce aflatoxin in water using a bioreactor.
It was discovered twice that the control water, which was
from a water tank used to serve the laboratory where the
work was undertaken, contained aflatoxins (B2, G2). Thewater,
which had been inoculated with Aspergillus flavus and incu-
bated, did not (Paterson unpubl.). Presumably, the fungus
had degraded the aflatoxins present and hence they were no
longer detectable. This raises the question, how did the
Fungi and fungal toxins as weapons 1007aflatoxins arise in the control water? An A. flavus strain was
isolated from the control water thus indicating how the afla-
toxins may have arisen. A. flavus is not associated with pro-
ducing aflatoxin Gs and so another contaminant may have
been present. However, it is not known whether this was
from the natural growth of a fungus or from the intentional
addition of fungus or toxins from a disgruntled employee. Cer-
tainly, numerous fungi were available at this particular orga-
nisation. The water was used for a variety of purposes, such
as washing benches, cleaning floors, and supplying showers,
so the levels of aflatoxins would have accumulated over the
years and would have been breathed in. Indeed, it could
have been drunk. Only a survey of similar water tanks would
indicate if this contamination was normal or deliberate.
In addition, T-2 toxin can be used as a food or water-borne
(Paterson & Lima 2005) poison. Currently, T-2 toxin is the only
biologically active toxin effective through dermal exposure,
respiratory, and gastrointestinal (GI) portals. Tissues involved
in high cellular turnover (e.g. GI and respiratory epithelium,
bone marrow cellular elements) are the most susceptible to
the toxin (Locasto et al. 2004).
The threat of toxins and particularly mycotoxins are made
apparent in Garber et al. (2005), Miller et al. (2005), and Stark
(2005). The current terrorist tactics have shifted attention to
protection of food supplies, and consequently, it is a world-
wide concern for the 21st century. The impact on society could
be anything from low to ‘‘catastrophic’’. A huge range of
Table 2 – Some toxins or secondary metabolites of
entomopathogenic fungi
Entomopathogens Secondary metabolites/toxins
Aspergillus flavusa Aflatoxins
Aspergillus ochraceusb Ohratoxin A
Metarrizium anisopliae Cytochalasin C, D, helvolic acid,
destruxins
Beauvaria bassiana Beauvericin, dipicolinic acid, oosporein,
isoleucylisoleucyl anhydride, cyclo-
(L-isoleucyl-L-valine, cyclo-(L-alanyl-
L-proline), bassianolide
B. brongniartii Beauverolide L, La
Lecanicillium lecanii Helvolic acid, bassianolide
Paecilomyces fumosoroseus Beauverolide L, La
Colletotrichum
gloeosporioides
Gloeosporone
Trichoderma harzianumc Koninginin A,C, peptaibols, harzianum,
cyclonerodiol, octaketide keto diol 6,
three octaketide-derived compounds,
6-n-pentyl-2H-pyran-2-one (6PAP),
trichorzianines A,B
Penicillium oxalicum Oxalic acid, oxaline, secalonic acid,
Fusarium oxysporum Moniliformin, hydroxylated
fumonisin C1, fumonisin C4,
fusaric acid, benzoic acid, enniatins,
fusaric acid, fusarin C, ipomeamarones,
sambutoxin.A
a Not used.
b Not used. Pathogen of Ceratitis capitata (Castillo et al. 2000)
amongst other insects. Well-known producer of ochratoxins.
c The metabolites from Trichoderma is a large field and so only
a proportion of the compounds detected are given here. Similarly,
the changing taxonomy of the genus precludes any definite state-
ments concerning species and secondary metabolite relationships.actions and programmes are being developed and imple-
mented to prevent, deter, and respond to potential attacks.
For example: (1) enhanced laboratory capability; (2) advanced
tracking; (3) increased examinations; (4) enhanced surveil-
lance; (5) more training; (6) recovery plans; and (7) new medi-
cal treatments. The above authors mention that mycological
and chemical sampling and detection methodologies need to
be geared up. Inactivation of mycotoxins and decontamina-
tion of food plants require urgent consideration. Foods need
to be ranked in terms of vulnerability to attack, as do the risks
to people when foods are intentionally contaminated. The de-
velopment of algorithms to differentiate natural from unnat-
ural food contamination (Paterson & Lima 2005) are
required. International and national collaborations are essen-
tial. Finally, biomarkers in humans and animals need to be
further developed with particular relevance to metabolomics
(Paterson 2006b).
a-Amanitin from Amanita phalloides, amongst others, is
a big concern as it is extremely toxic, water soluble, and
heat stabile (Garber et al. 2005). However, mass production
would presumably be limited to solid substrate bioreactors if
basidiomes were used or conventional bioreactors if myce-
lium can produce the compound. The background counts of
amanitin and T-2 toxin were useful as a demonstration of
what is required to be done to distinguish abnormal from nor-
mal concentrations of biotoxins. However, in some cases the
background was higher than the spiked samples. In some
ways the paper by Stark (2005) is both alarming and reassuring
in what is possibly an overly dramatic paper in the introduc-
tion at least. The use of mycotoxins as large-scale tactical
weapons is impractical but could be used in the sabotage
arena. It is also reassuring that antidotes do already exist for
some mycotoxins.
The concept of liver cancer from aflatoxin as a battlefield
weapon is ludicrous, and the reports of acute toxicity are
uncertain. The compound as a weapon can hardly be taken
seriouslyapart fromasuggestedpsychological effect, although
acute poisonings have been considered. Conversely, the expo-
sure to T-2 toxin of a few milligrams is potentially lethal. The
concept of mass production of the compound may be imprac-
tical simply because of the quantity of growth medium re-
quired (Stark 2005) and it would take a vast amount of malt
extract to produce significant amounts. Althoughwhether an-
other cheaper and more plentiful medium could be used is
a possibility, although what this might be is uncertain.
Water
Drinking, or non-drinking water may be an effective medium
for mycotoxin dispersal as a weapon and is worthy of a sepa-
rate section. The threat from contaminated drinking water is
obvious. In the case of non-drinking water, the toxin could
be spread by spray from a shower and then breathed in.
Work places where a lot of water may be employed, such as
farms, or a car wash, could be susceptible. The levels of safety
required for water for livestock may be considerably lower
than water for human consumption, so this could be a poten-
tial route of attack. In an example, storedwater that was dem-
onstrated to contain aflatoxins was used to clean laboratories
1008 R. R. M. Patersonand so contaminated dust could be spread accumulatively.
Toxins in water are possible naturally, unnaturally, and
from inoculation of fungi (Paterson & Lima 2005).
FBCA
These are givenmore space thanmight bemerited in a general
review of bioweapons. However, there are some interesting
parallels between the concepts of fungal weapons vs FBCA.
This technology needs to be reassessed. FBCA are of great in-
terest to mycologists and issues are now being raised regard-
ing safe use (Skrobek et al. 2005) which are especially relevant
in the current high-security climate. For example, the proce-
dures involve applying natural fungal pathogens to crops in
the field or in storage, to control insect pests or disease.
They have been advocated by some as an effective and more
particularly, an environmentally sound means of controlling
pests, disease, and undesirable organisms. A major concern
regarding these preparations is how safe they are in terms
of toxin production (Skrobek et al. 2005; Strasser et al. 2000). Af-
ter all, they could affect the general population and workers
producing the FBCA. They have been introduced or tested dis-
proportionately in developing countries where, ironically, the
mycotoxin problem is worse.
In a large study on risk assessment Strasser et al. (2000) did
not consider the situation of compounds produced by BCAs,
which are already-known mycotoxins. For example, cytocha-
lasins are not discussed, although they are produced by
Metarhizium anisopliae, which is considered by the authors.
Cytochalasin D (Fig 4), in particular, is classified as very toxic.
If it is satisfactory to use the fungi mentioned because the
levels in the environment would be low, is it equally safe,
for example, to use Aspergillus flavus which produces afla-
toxins or A. ochraceus which produce ochratoxin A (OTA)?
There needs to be some consistent scientific thinking here.
An example of a FBCA is the use of Fusarium oxysporum (as
F. oxysporum f. sp. exythoroxilum) to kill coca plants in certain
Latin American countries (Connick et al. 1998; de Vries 2000).
Interestingly, the idea is to introduce a disease rather than
a cure. The ultimate objective is to stop themanufacture of co-
caine. Table 2 lists the toxins associated with the fungus, and
it appears that the effect of this FBCA has not had sufficient
consideration. The concepts of what constitutes this taxon
are complex, and toxin production from different special
forms has not been clarified satisfactorily. The technology is
similar to what would be required for the production of
a bioweapon.
Fig 4 – Chemical structure of cytochalasin D.Mycotoxins have been ranked as the most important
chronic risk factor in the diet above pesticide residues, syn-
thetic contaminants, plant toxins, and food additives as men-
tioned previously (Bennet & Klich 2003). They are considered
more acutely toxic than pesticides. Those interested in apply-
ing this technology need to collaborate more fully with those
who know how to control the secondarymetabolism that pro-
duces the toxins, although control of production in the field
will be difficult in a predictable manner.
Pharmaceuticals
The surprising fact that penicillin can be detected in food-
stuffs has been highlighted recently (Laich et al. 2002). Obvi-
ously, when there is such concern about resistant bacteria,
and sensitised patients, this needs serious consideration.
The penicillins are also inherently toxic as many who have
been on a course of the drugwill testify. Again the issue is con-
centration; exposure to low concentrations causes some of
the resistance problems. Another example is mycophenolic
acid. This has only recently has been adopted as an
immuno-suppressive pharmaceutical but has been longer
known as aminormycotoxin. Patulinmay also be worthmen-
tioning as it was originally described as a pharmaceutical but
was considered to be too toxic for general use. However, it is
now firmly in the mycotoxin camp.
Future trends
I predict that there will be more compounds considered as
mycotoxins within 10 y; the trend is for more compounds to
be included. Mycotoxins will become acceptable only at ever
decreasing concentrations tending towards background
levels. Increasing numbers will be shown to be toxic and pres-
ent in different foods. So the mycotoxin circle in Fig 2 will be-
come wider. I also predict that the number of FBCAs will
decrease. Also, compounds from these may begin to be con-
sidered more seriously as mycotoxins (e.g. destruxins), and
consequently, will result in fewer FBCAs. The trend for
weapons is difficult to predict. It may be that they will begin
to be considered as ‘‘not effective’’. Alternatively, they could
expand into the ‘‘non-mycotoxin toxins’’ (e.g. Cole & Schwei-
kert 2003a,b; Cole et al. 2003). This type of activity is reported in
the literature but the compounds are not usually found, or in-
vestigated, in food.
Genetically modified fungi (GMO)
It is possible to speculate about altered strains that could be
more virulent or produce higher yields of toxins than the
wild-type. Countries with large resources could perhaps de-
velop such strains. It is something of a worst case scenario.
However, it is probably only a matter of time before such an
organism exists considering the developments in genetics, if
it does not already. In developed countries transfer of cultures
from genetic resource collections to second parties involves
the completion of a ‘‘material transfer agreement’’ which for-
bids genetic modification of the received cultures unless con-
tainment is increased to accommodate the GMO. However, it
Fungi and fungal toxins as weapons 1009is not clear what GMOs mean. Does it specifically require that
genetic information is transferred from one taxon to another?
A useful example is how the titre of penicillin has been vastly
increased from the original meagre amounts by strain im-
provement techniques and this could perhaps be undertaken
for toxin production.
Security of laboratories and obtaining
pure mycotoxins
This issue is discussed in depth in Tucker (2003), although
some controversial issues are raised, such as which individ-
uals and laboratories could be allowed to work in the field,
and can the degree of control possible in the USA be applied
to other countries. The degree of risk pertaining to each situ-
ation needs to be determined. Put crudely, does working
with certain pathogenic bacteria equate in safety terms with
workingwith fungi? Is the risk from the fungus (i.e. a biological
one) or the toxin produced (i.e. a chemical one)? If it is the
toxin then would not chemical security procedures be more
appropriate and which have been established longer? There
are currently discussions on biosecurity within biological re-
source centres, which, in the case of fungi, roughly translates
to ‘‘culture collections’’. Some relevant concerns are raised by
the World Health Organisation (WHO 2003). Global events re-
cently have underlined the need to protect laboratories and
the materials they contain in a way that will protect people,
livestock, the environment, and agriculture. However, there
are distinctions between laboratory biosecurity and biosafety.
Biosecurity measures prevent intentional release, loss, mis-
use, theft, and diversion of pathogens and toxins. In contrast,
biosafety is containment procedures that are implemented to
prevent unintentional exposure of pathogens/toxins or acci-
dental release. Security precautions need to become routine
laboratory practice, according to the WHO.
In addition, anyone trying to obtain pure mycotoxins from
the chemical companies will realise that it has become more
difficult. Often legitimate proof of use is required. Presumably
this is because of security and not from an increased level of
concern for workers health per se. There is now also more pa-
per work and security surrounding sending toxigenic cultures
between laboratories. Concern with respect to health and
safety is mostly related to the mass production of fungi, espe-
cially dried conidia, which can be breathed in easily. Similarly
a great deal of care is required when handling purified and
dried toxin preparations.
Mycotoxicosis treatment
Supportive therapy formycotoxicosis is improved diet and hy-
dration of patients (Locasto et al. 2004). Taking super-activated
charcoal orally may be effective if toxins are swallowed
(e.g. T-2 toxin). The route of entry anddose indicate the clinical
course for T-2. From a detailed study of OTA toxicity and acti-
vation metabolism of aflatoxin B1, it was discovered that the
sweetener aspartame is very protective against OTA intoxica-
tion, and that Oltipraz effectively protects against AFB1 acute
toxicity and carcinogenicity (Stark 2005). Oltipraz has been
tested in China on populations exposed to aflatoxins (Bennet& Klich 2003). Some strains of Lactobacillus effectively bind di-
etary mycotoxins and may also be an effective treatment.
Mycotoxin decontamination
Biotoxins from fungi would be difficult to remove from food
and water (Paterson & Lima 2005). The methods devised by
Castegnaro et al. (1991) would at least be effective for the my-
cotoxin contamination of environments such as rooms. The
most usual procedure for decontamination is washing with
bleach, which effectively oxidises most aflatoxin and some
other mycotoxins (Stark 2005). Potassium permanganate un-
der alkaline conditions appears to be effective for a wider
range of mycotoxins and for more situations than bleach,
a point that appears to have been overlooked. The use of an
enzyme to degrade the toxin might be practical technically
but is probably not yet feasible as a routine or emergency
procedure. Sharpira (2004) provides extensive details on
decontamination of foods.
Some priorities
It needs to be recognised that it is the low molecular weight
toxins from fungi, not the fungus, that present the biggest
threat, apart from the remote possibility of a genetically engi-
neered fungus causing unconstrained damage. There is a re-
quirement to have an understanding of what are normal
levels of fungi and toxins in the environment (Gonc¸laves,
et al. 2006; Paterson & Lima 2005; Paterson in press). Which
toxins are acute in nature (e.g. T-2 toxin) and which are
more likely to be chronic (e.g. aflatoxins) should be estab-
lished. Methods for analysing the toxins are required. Fortu-
nately, some excellent methods for multimycotoxin analysis,
based on chromatography, exist as are described in Paterson &
Lima (2005). Some basic protocols are provided in that publi-
cation for water. Single method procedures for hundreds of
compounds are of particular value and standardised proto-
cols could be based on these. These can be compared with
PCR methods as detailed in Paterson (2006b). There are vast
amounts of data on the levels of the more well-known myco-
toxins in a variety of foods. CAST (2003) is a good starting
point, but there are more data from various surveys. It is
worthwhile listing those compounds that are water soluble
as this will be a crucial factor in water contamination and
also some foods. Information as to which foods are usually
contaminated with particular mycotoxins and which would
not normally be expected is essential. Furthermore, it is cru-
cial to appreciate the uncertainties in this form of analysis
(CAST 2003; Whitaker & Johansson 2005). For example, sam-
ples of corn contaminated with aflatoxin at 10 ng g1 and
10000 ng g1 are estimated to vary in a repeated subsequent
analysis by 0–33.9 ng g1 and 8992–11008 ng g1, respectively.
So one can immediately understand the problem of deciding
if a sample was intentionally contaminated.
Conclusions
Lowmolecular weight toxins from fungi need to be recognised
as the biggest threat as bioweapons. Fungi are perhaps not
1010 R. R. M. Patersona significant threat, although some toxins from them are.
However, various factors needs to be considered and not sim-
ply overall toxicity or notoriety. Ease of ‘‘weaponisation’’ is
important. However, T-2 toxin is a significant threat. Toxins,
other than the well-known mycotoxins, require consider-
ation. It is fundamental to be able to differentiate between
normal and abnormal concentrations of toxins or fungi in
the food and water supplies.
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